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Illegal Weapons Traffic
in Eastern Europe
Executive Summary
The primary focus of this study is on illegal weapons trade in Romania and the
Caucasus region of the former USSR.
Illegal weapons traffic in these regions is linked with both organized crime and
terrorist activities.
The main source of weapons for conflicts in the Caucasus region is corruption in Russian
military circles.
One well-known Arab terrorist organization, the so-called Muslim Brothers, has active
connections in Romania.
There is a incipient growing of trade with components, products and substances used in
the manufacturing of mass destruction weapons (chemical, biological and nuclear).
Free trade conventions between the CIS states facilitate illegal weapons transactions in the
former USSR.
In Eastern Europe there has been a steady increase of trade in components, products and
substances used in the manufacturing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
Many of the most recent Russian weapons, such as the B-94, have gone directly from the
factory to the Caucasus arms bazaars. Chechen troops had the B-94 before it was issued to Russian
soldiers.
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Weapons Trade in the Caucasus
After September 11, 2001 it became more difficult to express precisely what is
meant by the term “weapons”. That event forced a reexamination of the traditional
definition of weapons and, with it, a new concept of what constitutes a weapon. What we
do know is that illegal commerce in weapons, by whatever definition, is widespread
throughout Eastern Europe and the former USSR. The conventional illegal arms trade in
the Caucasus is one of the most significant in the post-Communist world. The airports of
the Caucasus are also among the most vulnerable in the world and may, at some future
date, constitute an equally threatening factor in this new environment. The appearance of
the computer, something else which can also be used a weapon, elevates the technological
level of the threat growing from this region.
There are some basic assumptions about weapons traffic in this region. First, the
Caucasus have always been armed. This was true even during Soviet times when a
totalitarian government conducted constant surveillance. It has simply always been like
this, though at times less so. The Caucasus and arms are concepts which have always been
together. In Soviet times, up until the fall of the Soviet Union, the center of the arms trade
has been in the Caucasus. Weapons there were specific. Those sold at the bazzaar in
Nazrani were older, mostly arms from the time of the Civil War. The “Mauser” pistol
enjoyed the greatest popularity. There were no modern weapons such as automatics.
Weapon Merchants : As one would expect, almost all of the weapons in the
Caucasus are of Soviet or Russian origin. There are simply no foreign weapons in the
Caucasus. Russian authorities are conducting an extensive anti-terrorism campaign in the
region and often claim that foreign weapons are being used. One of the most frequent
illustrations of this assertion has come from Russian generals who display walkie-talkies
made by “Kenwood”. The presence of such instruments, they claim, proves that foreign
weapons have been introduced thus elevating the crisis to one they describe as
“international terrorism”. Such Western items are sold routinely in stores in Moscow
because there are practically no walkie-talkies of Russian origin. Thus, it is important to
note that weapons are mainly of Soviet or Russian origin.
There are several reasons for Russian domination of the arms trade. The first is that
the main source for weapons in the Caucasus has been either the Soviet or the Russian
army. Second, arms were further redistributed in the Caucasus from one hand to another,
among “our own”. This is how the arms trade in the Northern Caucasus began. These
structures are the original sources of weapons. The first such large source, from which it
was possible to obtain weapons, was the Chechen Republic. In 1991, when federal
authorities left Chechnya they abandoned a large arsenal of weapons. There were many
troops in Chechnya and the arsenals had everything, from automatic weapons to nuclear
warheads. Really, someone warned of this or someone foresaw this situation and removed
nuclear weapons from the Caucasus before 1991. They were taken from Chechnya and
from Nalchik and no such weapons remain in the Caucasus. But what remained, including
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the training L-33 airplanes remained in Chechnya and became the property of local
authorities.
Russian Armaments. In the post-Soviet era, a great need for weapons emerged. As
conflicts began in Southern Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Ossetian-Ingush, arms flooded into the
Caucasus. For many people this created an impression of illegality as a matter of routine.
The President of the Chechen Republic, Dzhokhar Dudayev, didn’t transfer a single gun or
automatic to Abkhazia or other regional hotspots. All of the weapons were purchased in
the arms markets for cash and transported by small AN-2 airplanes to Abkhazia. Weapons
were purchased at Russian military bases in Russia proper or in Abkhazia and then
transported into the conflict zone. As a result of this traffic, in Abkhazia there are now
approximately 100 armored vehicles, about 200 artillery units, an entire squadron of L-39
military aircraft, numerous military boats, and a wide assortment of small arms. While
conflict in Abkhazia began with little more than hunting rifles and the level of military
technology steadily became more complex and deadly.
Arms entered Southern Ossetia in exactly the same way. Ossetian servicemen in the
Russian army were one of the main sources of weapons - the Ossetians constituted a large
percentage of the generals and colonels who were serving in the army and they transferred
weapons from their sectors into Southern Ossetia. Moreover, the weapons purchased in
Chechnya were bought on Russian bases.
There is also an active arms trade in the Gall region of Georgia where many
entrepreneurs have grown wealthy selling weapons to Abkhazians. These same individuals
sell weapons in Southern Ossetia and throughout the Northern Caucasus. A large portion
of the weapons which arrived in Karachayev -Circassia were new, still packed in boxes from
the factories, and came in large numbers directly out of the base supply centers.
The main source of weapons for the conflict is corruption in Russian military
circles. This arms buildup could never have taken place had not senior Russian military
officials realized that there was considerable profit to be made from the sale of weapons to
combatants everywhere, including those places in which Russian soldiers were the targets
In general, one may assume that if a conflict began in the North Caucacus, the
weapons would appear immediately. There was never a long-term shortage of weapons in
this region. The Transcaucasian region played a large role in providing the North Caucasas
with weapons. The deputy commander of the Transcaucasian region was General Sufyan
Depayev. Depayev is Balkar with many connections in the illegal weapons market who sold
arms to both sides in any conflict. He provided them to both the Armenians and the
Azerbaijanis, as he had to the Georgians and Abkhazians. After retirement from the army,
Depayev became the chairman of the commission for the rehabilitation of the Balkar
people.
Depayev’s influence over the region’s weapons traffic became apparent early in the
Georgian conflict. In 1992, a group of fifty unidentified men seized 600 loads of
ammunition from a Russian Army depot in Tbilisi. Russian authorities pointed to the fact
that an operation of such a scale could not have been carried out without significant
official protection and support. While criminal charges were never made, it was apparent
that they saw Depayev as the principal figure in the theft.

C e n t e r

f o r

S e c u r i t y

a n d

S c i e n c e

2 0 0 2

6
I l l e g a l

W e a p o n s

T r a f f i c

I n

E a s t e r n

E u r o p e

At the beginning of the Chechen conflict, Chechen officials found that the
opposition forces led by Dzhokhar Dudayev had sold a large amount of weapons on the
illegal market. This created a significant shortage in Chechnya so officials began to
stockpile weapons of all types. The first anti-tank equipment came from the Baltic states
but Chechen authorities soon found a new source for an even greater variety of weapons.
They simply bought them from the opposing side and at an exceptionally low price.
Moreover, the Chechens used this situation to develop an effective theme for psychological
operations. In 1995, while buying arms from the Russians, they filmed the entire
transaction and circulated it on Russian television. While there had long been rumors that
Russian generals were selling weapons to their enemies, few people had actually believed
this. The film constituted an important and devastating piece of evidence that this
unpopular military campaign was being undermined by Russia’s own military
establishment.
The special services announcement that they had confiscated weapons in the
Caucasus and that they are stopping the influx of weapons is simply ludicrous. It is difficult
to believe but in the city of Nalchik a sniper rifle called a “Tiger” can be purchased for
12,000 rubles and, considering the total corruption of everyone and everything, for 1,500
rubles ($50) one can get a license for keeping arms in the Russian Federation. This is yet
another source for the export of weapons to the Caucasus. Another well-known weapons,
the SVD sniper rifle, is also available for most buyers. Practically all Caucasians are now, in
one way or another, trying to buy weapons that are sold in hunting stores. Several points.
First, these are hunting rifles that can be modified into military weapons. They simply
received new passports. One of the examples of these “Tigers” is the SVD Sniper Rifle
hunting carbine “Seyga” which can be converted into a modernized
Kalashnikov. It has a component that can be ground down, making
the hunting rifle fire just like a regular Kalashnikov. Besides this
there are plenty of different special services and, also taking into
account the ubiquitous criminal and terrorist elements, plenty of
people that are licensed to carry arms.
Any normal colonel could sit and talk about how weapons shuffle from one army
to another. A black or a grey market. There is even a legal market through which illegal
items pass. It is probably not difficult to remember several scandals when hundreds of
armored vehicles from Russia ended up in Armenia, either according to the Tashkent
agreement or, as reported in the media, purchased in some Moscow Bazaar by the
Armenians.
Foreign Weapons. As far as foreign arms are concerned, they were like museum
exhibits. In Abkhazia Kalashnikovs of Romanian origin appeared. There were many of
them. After a month the owners of this automatic all tried to relinquish it. It is cheap but
less in demand. Not strangely, arms also come from Central Asia. The governments of
Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are also actively involved in the arms
trade. Weapons come from the Ukraine. In this scheme the legal, civilized arms trade in
Russia became even more civilized. That is, Russia began commercial sales, with an enduser certificate and a check of where they were going. But the black market still remained.
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What is to be done? How is it possible to open an arms dealership on every corner. Serious
research needs to be done and information on the Caucasus needs to be considered in this
plan. Apropos of this some kind of monitoring needs to set up in the Caucasus. I am
disturbed by the fact that the arms trade has begin to change qualitatively. Automatics and
tanks are no longer needed. Now people are beginning to go for the latest weapons. For
example the B-94, the latest work of the Russian army, has not yet entered the ranks of the
Russian soldiers but is already there in Chechnya, held by the Chechen opposition. This is
an indicator of how the latest weapons can go from construction straight to the Caucasus.
Do terrorists in the Northern Caucasus use the latest weapons? Is it possible that in the
Caucasus they have biological or nuclear weapons? I don’t think that they have these right
now in the Caucasus or terrorist organizations capable of carrying out an attack like the
one in New York with such extensive preparation and planning. But we have Basayev’s
raids on Budenovsk and Pervomaiskoye, which I consider to be two tiered. It is possible to
look on it as guerrilla warfare, that is, if Basayev had seized Budenovsk this would have at
least been a military action. But there was also a terrorist aspect. They seized the hospital
and took innocent people hostage. Both of these raids showed that unprecedented cases
are possible in the Caucasus. I would say that this is a vulnerable region in many ways. For
example, I believe that the most important point that needs to be guarded by the entire
world is the dam outside the city of Krasnodar. If something there collapses, Krasnodar will
be wiped out. Still, this dam is very carelessly guarded.
The question always remains “who financed this?” It is not likely Chechnya or
Russia. But there are many counterfeit dollars of Iraqi origin in Chechnya and in the
Cuacasus, Russia and other countries of the CIS. Somewhere in Iraq or the Near East, I
don’t want to pin it down, they have arranged the production of excellent counterfieted
American dollars. The majority of the weapons the Chechens have purchased from the
other side were done so with counterfeit dollars.
Nevertheless, weapons were on the move and it happened that during conflicts in
Chechnya, during military activities, Chechnya was, for several months, in need of
weapons, only to later have such an automatic supply that they again began to export them,
again contiguous territories began to buy arms from Chechnya. All of this unfolded within
a very interesting framework. Sovereignty offers not only a political meeting but also other
political activities. One of the tendencies of sovereignty in the former Soviet republics is
that they, becoming large, independent states, decided to carry on their own arms
production. In principle this production was set in the Caucasus. In Abkhazia, for example
they tried to establish a factory for the production of certain types of weapons. They made
superior grenades. Their grenades. The same thing was tried in two other regions of the
Caucasus. Their were attempts to produce pistols in Armenia and Chechnya called
“Porsyus”. The pistols were unsuccessful and they were rarely use. In the Caucasus they
were used more as something exotic, and therefore in such trivialities that it is best not to
spend any time in it.
Of course the production of some kinds of weapons had to carried out and thus
Georgia enters the scene. In Georgia there was a factory for the production of weapons.
During the Abkhazian conflict the Georgians established a structure for shells. All of these
weapons were used in conflicts and in open military clashes.
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One of the most significant and telling events about weapons traffic did not occur
in the Caucasus but in Moscow and Volgodonsk when powerful explosions destroyed large
buildings. I don’t know who planed this but I don’t believe that the Karachayevets could
have done it. The singularity of this terrorist act resides in its unique use of human
psychology. The fact is that all of the Russian special services, with the exception of
demolitions, didn’t know that there could be such an explosive. In each case the explosive
was associated with TNT. This is of course to the shame of the Russian special services but
they themselves told the media that the Moscow explosion was carried out openly, in cars
that had obviously false invoices, on one of which was written “sugar”. It is most interesting
that no bribes were taken, what is taken for “sugar”. To such a degree that all of this was
something ordinary. So much so that there were numerous witnesses and no one knew
what was happening.
This is why I began by saying that I didn’t know what could now be called weapons. If
in this car there were a single cartridge or a single stick of TNT then it is always possible
that the car could be detained. But all of these explosives were carried openly and all of the
representatives of the special services (GAIs and policemen) didn’t know that they were
explosives. This psychological factor has been used strongly in the Caucasus. This is one
method in which weapons were changed in terrorist acts.
Feasibility of Instituting Controls. The Caucasus are something unique and
through them there are only four roads. Actually there are only three since one is divided
into two parts. These are the Derbentskaya railroad, the military Sukhumskaya road, and
the military Georgian road, in addition to a small concentration of Transcaucasians. So to
block three roads is theoretically possible. It is easier to block them than 100 roads. But
although posts exist there are no roadblocks at any point in these roads.
The most dangerous terrorist region has been the Mineralnaya Voda region. According
to several assumptions tactics have changed in the Minvod region. This is nearly the
regional center of a large territory in which we can include Kabardino-Balkariya,
Karachayevo-Circassia, even Northern Ossetia and the Stavropol krai. The Minvod region
is a strong transportation junction. The largest airport and train station are there. The
majority of the terrorist acts took place there. Anything that could be attacked was. They
seized busses, helicopters, and airplanes. It is there that Basayev captured an airplane and
flew to Turkey. This was still before the Chechen conflict. Few knew that during the Coup
attempt Shamil Basayev was located there. He bought grenades and went to defend the
white house.
When these terrorist attacks were being carried out the issue came up of how to close
the channels and access. The first thing that they thought of was to cut off access in this
region. Blockades were set up throughout the Caucasus, every 50 kilometers. These were
not GAI posts but ones of actual concrete. At every post you were stopped. These were in
every region where there were conflicts and even in ones where there weren’t any.
This did not become an obstacle for the distribution of arms. The army, from whom
the weapons were purchased, transported them through the blockades. To put it roughly,
no one drives to Krasnodar to purchase weapons since the Russian army is everywhere.
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Arms have begun to migrate. When the presidential election began in Karachevo-Circassia
a unique situation occurred. The closest region from which it was easy to get weapons was
Abkhazia. Karachayev -Circassia had its own border with Abkhazia - mountains and passes.
Of course weapons began to enter from Abkhazia. From all accounts the arms dealers have
no ethnic or political platforms for their trade.

Weapons Trade in Romania
After 1989 the Romanian weapon industry and weapon sales plummeted
dramatically. The main reason of this recession was the change of official Romanian policy
in relationship with the traditional trade partners. Most of these partners were countries
sanctioned by the international community and the western states whose benevolence the
Romanian Government seeks now. As a direct consequence of signing the international
agreements of arm control and export the Government prohibited the Romanian weapon
exports to countries under embargo or involved in conflicts. This led to a 90% decrease in
the weapon production compared to 1989.
The fact that the Romanian weapon industry is not competitive on the international
market is another factor that contributed to the decay of the Romanian weapon trade.
The current situation of the Romanian weapon industry is difficult, and the state
authorities try to anchor this industry by implementing reorganization, restructuring and
conversion programs. The two large producers of military equipment, weapons and
technology in Romania – Regia Arsenalul Armatei and RATMIL – incorporate twentythree plants and two research institutes. Beside these, there are sixty-five state-owned
companies administered by the State Ownership Fund that have military facilities. Regia
Arsenalul Armatei is subordinated to the Minister of Defense and RATMIL is
subordinated to the Minister of Industry. Because the Ministers of Defense and of the
Interior pursue the goal upgrading the Armed Forces weapons and technology to NATO
standards and because the modernization of the Romanian weapon industry is still just a
project for which the authorities look for financing, the only chance of survival this
industry has remains the export of weapons in the “hot” areas of the world, export that
should avoid breaking the international agreements.
Directia de Protectie si Securitate Militara 1 (counterintelligence) and Directia de
Investigatii Economice 2 (within the Minister of Interior) are responsible for checking that
the weapon business are in compliance with the international agreements and the weapon
shipments do not reach countries in conflict or countries that support terrorism. These
institutions have to know everything about the local exporters, the importers and their
intentions. Unofficially, Serviciul de Informatii Externe 3 is also mandated to check the
1

Department of Military Protection and Security
Department of Economic Investigations
3
External Intelligence Service
2
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importers, the final destination of the weapon shipments being sometimes checked in the
field by the military attachés of Directia de Informatii Militare 4, based on the agreement of
the authorities in the importing country.
Basically these services are in the position to know weather or not a Romanian
weapon export breaks an international agreement, even in the event that the Government
endorses such an illegal export on political or economic grounds.

Types of Arms Found in Romania
 Automated pistols: Glock. This type of pistol is very versatile, has 17 cartridges, and it
is very hard to detect because the cover and other parts are made in ceramic.
 Assault carbins: AK-47, Heckler&Koch
 Machine guns: Armalite
 Grenade throwers: AG 7 or RPG 7
 Rockets: Stinger, SAM. Most of these rockets were brought from Afghanistan. They
home-in using the thermal print for the target.
 Ammunition: the most impressive ammunition found was made of Teflon
 Explosive: Semtex. This explosive can be used in the manufacturing of letter-bombs
that explode when bent, or exposed to X-rays or heat. These types of bombs usually
have a photoelectric trigger and are disguised in envelopes of a 7-8 mm height,
weighting 50-80 grams. Semtex can be disguised
in luggage. This kind of bomb is usually
detonated by a regular fuse or by remote
control. Semtex can be disguised in explosive
belts hidden in textile fibers. This method used
mostly by Kurds. This explosive can also be
used for barometrical bombs for hijacking
planes.
 Targeting systems: laser spotting devices
 Stun-guns

Destructive Impact of Semtex

Weapons Trade and Organized Crime
The Italian Mob. Since 1989, the Romanian authorities have identified and then deported
a number of foreign citizens that were involved in subversive activities. Important members
of the international organized crime have been declared undesired, being denied the right
to enter the Romanian territory again because they put in danger the national security.
Behind all these people – representing links of a mob-like structure – there are hidden
interests that target the Romanian political and economical environments. In other words,
organizations such as PKK, Cosa Nostra, The Red Japanese Army, The Muslim Brothers

4

Department of Military Intelligence
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etc., have extended their ramifications in Romania. The Romanian secret services try to
keep this situation under control.
Although these mobs function based on very strict rules and codes and operate
under cover, the Romanian secret services have discovered some of their vulnerabilities.
The Italian Marco Candio di Lerhia, born in 1957, was declared undesired on the
Romanian territory for a period of 5 years. This person was a member of Cosa Nostra and
there was information that the purpose of his visit to Romania was to recruit Romanians
for his organization.
The Italian mob organization – Camorra Napolitana has also similar interests in
our country. An important member of Cmorra, Antonio di Gabrielle, age 43, was
identified and declared undesired by the Romanian authorities. Di Gabrielle was part of
the “Alfieri” clan – the extremist-terrorist fraction of Camorra. He established in Romania
in 1993 hiding from the Italian authorities that were searching for him under charges of
financial and banking offenses, and extremely violent crimes. His mission was to organize a
network of companies meant to money laundering the funds of the clan. The amounts
were deposited in different Western banks and their sources were mainly drug and arms
traffic and kidnapping. In order to reach his goals, the Italian has evaded taxes, swindled
his business partners and tried to corrupt public employees. Di Gabrielle assiduously
searched for by the Interpol because he had paved his way with a big number of murders.
Romeo Alfio, a member of the Sicilian family Mussi de Ficurina, led by Paolo di
Mauro – aka “The Professor”, has been extradited from Romania. Romeo Alfio had an
impressive background, being the coordinator of an international drug and arms traffic
network. His partners in Germany had important connections in the Balkans, especially in
Roia. During the press conference related to his extradition, the Romanian police
presented Alfio as being part of the mafia family Laudani, well known for their murders,
thefts, robberies, and forceful defrauds in the Catania province.
Interpol has issued a general search warrant for Marzio Bartesaghi, age 38, after the
Court in Como sentenced him in 1995 to 10 years and 8 months of prison. The fugitive
escaped from Italy. He was wanted for drug, and military arms and ammunition traffic.
Bartesaghi was arrested in downtown Bucharest by officers of the Anti Organized Crime
Brigade of the Minister of Interior. The officers found him and after an extended watch,
managed to arrest him. Baresaghi declared he was hiding in the apartment of one of his
friends, in downtown Bucharest. He was deported in Italy based on a police investigation
that established the illegal aspects of its activities.
The Chinese Mob. The classical formula of organization that the Chinese mob uses
is known by Europeans by the name of “Triad”. The word comes from English and makes
reference to the sacred triangle that unites the sky, the earth and the man in a holistic and
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unitary entity. Etymologically, the Chinese term is better translated by “The Heavenly
Brotherhood”.
The “Silence Law” that is resumed by the Italian Mafia through “Omerta” is
illustrated by the Chinese triads through a Taoist proverb: “When alive don’t go to
authorities, when dead don’t go to hell”
The Chinese started to emigrate in Romania on a large scale during the very first
months of 1990. Between 1990-1997 approximately 70,000 Chinese citizens entered the
Romanian territory, most of them explaining the reasons of their trips through personal,
business and sometimes cultural interests. Currently there are 3000 companies with
Chinese participation.
Mariei Yanamora Galvez, entered Romania using false documents and declaring himself a
German citizen. In fact her name was Ekita Yukyko, 48 years, a Japanese citizen and a
member of many important mobs in the Country of the Rising Sun. Yukyko was deported
from Romania with a Tarom air flight going from Bucharest to Bangkok and during the
flight she was taken over by the Japanese secret services, which arrested her.
In October 1997 she was involved in hijacking a Japan Airlines airplane on the
Tokyo-Dacca route. Under the threats that Yukyko and the Japanese terrorist group waged,
the Japanese government accepted to give them a big amount of money and agreed to
release six members of the Red Japanese Army terrorist organization that were detained at
the time in Japanese prisons.

The Gypsy Mob. Over the last years many leaders of the Bucharest interlope world
were attracted in operations that resemble those of the Italian mob: car theft and traffic,
prostitution, human traffic, art traffic, drugs and arms traffic.
The younger members of the Gypsy Mob are influenced by the methods employed
by the Eastern European Mobs such us the Ukrainian, Chechen and Serbian mobs.
Among the members of the gypsy mob that embrace these methods are the Gemeni
brothers, the Corsicani brothers, the Belgieni clan, the Tobosari clan, etc.
These Gypsy clans have one or more important representatives in the Bucharestian
organized crime named by the press the state authorities – the gypsy mob. There are also
forces of the interlope world belonging to the older generation: Duduianu, Stoaca,
Cracanatu, Capatina, Camatari brothers, Raducanu brothers, Pian represent names of
such gypsy clans.
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Among the most important figures of these clans one can name Gigi Boeru, Fane
Spoitoru, Oane al lui Ciuca, Bobi al lui Ghioala, Pian, Udile, Ghorghe Craiu, Ragalie, or
Papuasu (the last two are well-known pimps).
The Romanian Mob. According to the experts, since 1989 the pole of
international organized crime has moved in Eastern Europe, Romania becoming one of
the main targets of the international mobs. Constanta has become a favorite port for the
Kurdish, Ukrainian and Turkish criminals due to its very attractive geographical position,
as a nexus of the drug and arms routes.
This area is controlled by the Saceanu clan, made of Ismail Iasar (aka Saceanu) and
his son, Sedan Iasar. The area between Neptun-Olimp and Vama Veche is controlled by
Beinur Nuredin under the protection of Nicu Gheara.
In the fall of 1999, when Saceanu’s men attacked with swords the bodyguards of a
Kurdish mob-member, Fatih Kesser, in front of the “Classis” restaurant, the latter
answered with gun shoots.

Weapons Trade and Terrorist Organizations
The Arab terrorist organization – The Muslim Brothers – has connections in
Romania. In May last year, an important member of this group was discovered in Romania
and declared undesired for a period of 3 years. Ahmed Eltayeb Mohed, age 30, entered
Romania in 1989 declaring that he wanted to attend the “Carol Davilla” University of
Medical and Pharmacy Science. He started a company – Fawar – that served as a disguise
for his activities. During his stay, his main mission was to recruit members for the Muslim
Brothers with the purpose of establishing a strong branch of this organization in Romania,
which was to be the launching place of a series of assassinations and violent actions.
The Kurdish terrorist organization – PKK 5 – is also well represented in Romania.
Davut Yavuz, age 35 was declared undesired for a period of 5 years. Yavuz is a Turkish
citizen of a Kurdish descent that was involved in publishing and distributing a number of
newspapers of the organization. Besides that he was involved in raising funds to finance
the actions of the organization. Yavuz was considered a very dangerous person and he was
deported for being involved in activities that endangered the national security. Another
member of PKK, Diribas Ramzan, age 37 was declared undesired for a period of 5 years as
well. He established a number of companies that he used for money laundering and
financing the activities of PKK. He was presenting himself as Director of the Association of
Kurdish Merchants in Romania, a bogus organization unknown to the Romanian
authorities. Morover, he coordinated the ideological and paramilitary training of the
Kurds. These were trained on a farm in the Balta Alba village where the Prahova County
branch of the Service for Foreigners discovered two groups of foreigners that were illegally
accommodated.
5

The Party of the Kurdish Workers
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Upon the arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, the Turkish investigators have
obtained information according to which PKK had training camps in a number of
countries including Romania. Romanian authorities, upon the verification of the activities
of some Turkish citizens of a Kurd descent drew the conclusion that there was a PKK
training camp in Bucharest that was used to train terrorists whose mission were to spread
terror in Turkey and in the Occident, if not in Romania as well.
The Romanian police found at different addresses in the Capital grenades,
pyrotechnical blasting fuse (detonator?),
detonators with pyrotechnical ignitions,
detonating fuses, explosive plastic substances (Semtex), potassium permanganate, in other
words, all its needed in order to make bombs.
These bombes were to be detonated by remote control using special clocks and
cellular phones.
The trainees were recruited in Turkey among ethnic Kurds aged 18-21. They were
coming to Romania legally claiming themselves to be tourists or businesspeople. Upon
their arrival they were taken into the custody of “professors” – Kurdish PKK people
working undercover in Romania as foreign investors.
After a short transit stage, the recruits went through 7-10 days of military training
during which the future terrorists were taught almost everything about bombs and
explosives. Among the evidences captured by the police there was a manual in Kurdish that
was a real terrorist course with theoretical exposés and technical drawings.
The four arrested people (Ali Erdem, Ramazam Kizil, Murat Bulut and Sait
Sonmez) had false passports. Erdem and Kizil had three other false passports with their
pictures but different names.
The Turkish police arrested the alleged authors of the bombings at Mavi Carsi (13
victims) and the alleged author of the bombing at “Carousel” shop (Turkey, Istambul) that
led to the death of a driver. Two of the arrested people are charged with placing the
explosive and the third is charged with panning the attack that killed 13 people. About this
latter one, the chief of the Turkish police says “his name is Akin Yavas (age 39) and he
illegally returned to Turkey after he was trained in Romania in using bombs”.
According AFP, the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan declared during an
interrogatory at the prison on the Imrali Island that Romania, Iran and Iugoslavia
supported PKK. During this investigation the Kurdish leader made surprising statements
that he met the famous terrorist Carlos the Jackal and that PKK used Cyprus as a relay
country for drug traffic. “we have a training camp in Romania where the PKK members are
trained ideologically (politically)” said the Kurd leader without making any reference to the
period of time during which his organization benefited from these facilities.
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The tensions generated by the arrest of PKK leader Abdulah Ocalan have
propagated in Romania, adding to the series of four paid assassinations committed against
Turks of Kurdinsh descent and giving a new dimension to the terrorist phenomena in our
country.
Thus, during the investigation on the arson of two cars - a BMW 735 with the
license plate 34-MO-084 and a Cielo with the license plate GR-02-AKB, both belonging to
Turkish businessmen - the police noticed a Dacia 1310 with the license plate B-94-LID
that looked suspicious. The car was passing through the area (Grigore Alexandrescu Street,
near the building of the Turkish-Balkan Association) at the time of the crime. The police
succeeded to arrest the driver, a Kurd who stored in his apartment a real arsenal. The
investigations revealed that the car belonged to Idikurt Gulabi, age 28, from the Turkish
province of Elazig.
Police searched his apartment situated on 21-A Constantin Brancusi Street and
found twenty-three 7.65mm bullets, five 9mm cartridges and a 7.62mm bullet. Moreover,
there is a possibility that after the ballistic expertise the police would find enough evidences
to link Gulabi with the series of paid assassinations that took place over a two-month
period in Bucharest.
Turk Sahin Muzafer accompanied by another Turk of a Kurdish descent who was a
German resident arrived in Arad, in a business trip.
Later, in the “Corona” restaurant in Arad, three Tukrish citizens of a Kurdish
descent approached Shin Muzafer. They ordered Muzafer to surrender his money, the
passport and the car keys in order to be used by PKK. The talks were led by Suleyman
Bilen, aka Ylmaz, who was there along with his lieutenant, Kara Hasem. Following
Muzafer’s refuse, they threatened him to kidnap and molest his wife, in Germany. Two
days after, Ylmaz, Kara Hasem and 12 other people kidnapped Muzafer in front of his
house in Arad. They stole his BMW as well. The kidnappers stopped in a parking place 10
Km away from Bucharest, where Sahin Muzafer was taken over by other two Turks who
had arrived there in a black Opel Vectra with the license plate B-01-MXG that belonged to
Kara Hasem. Muzafer was kept in captivity in an unknown apartment.
Meanwhile, in Arad, the owner of the “Kardsler” company was contacted repeatedly by
different persons that were asking for DM 12.000 and the registration of Muzafer’s car.
The Kurds were perfectly organized, each of them using a code name in order to
conceal their identity. The police issued a general search warrant for the leader of the
group, known as Ylmaz..
It is worthwhile to mention that after the beginning of investigations a killer was
sent to Arad in order to eliminate the persons that testified against the leaders of the clan.
This killer escaped the police that was only able to capture his gun, a 9mm Makrov pistol
with silencer.
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Engin Cakmak, age 34, leader of a Kurdish terrorist group affiliated with PKK, was
arrested. The Interpol had been looking for him since 1996. The Kurd took refuge in
Romania after he led an armed group of six persons that assassinated two Turk
businessmen. Engin crossed the Romanian border and requested political asylum.
Although is request was rejected he continued to stay on the Romanian territory and
moved to Botosani, a small city in eastern Romania. Turkey requested the extradition of
the Kurd.
A special case was that of the Bilal Ballioglu, Turk, president of the Romanian
Foundation of Islamic Services. He worked for two years (1995-1997) as professor for the
International High School of Computer Science in Constant a and he used his position to
propagate ideas and theses considered to be very dangerous for the Romanian national
security including extremist and fundamentalist Muslim doctrines that required the
Muslims to start the Holly War – Jihad.

Domestic By-products of Weapons Trade
A revenge in underworld transformed in an unprecedented scandal which included
important names from police, justice and politics. The cause was a robbery -foreign
currency and jewels - of a total value of $500,000.
The owner of this goods, Mihai Bucurenciu accused of this robbery Cornel Dinicu,
Valentin Rãducanu and Claudiu Musat, former performance sportsmen .
Bucurenciu's lawyer , Bogdan Vlad, declared that the robbery took place in front of Mihai
Stanculescu's residence.
In the underworld of Bucharest began a real war. Valentin Rãducanu, one of those accused
by Bucurenciu and Costi Dobre –driver at Prosecutor's Office at the Court House of Sector
4 – were kidnapped, sequestered and tortured. Valentin Raducanu had been involved in a
scandal at the « Calyse » discotheque where he was caught in possession of hand grenades
and other arms.
The two gangs assembled commando troops, some of them formed by sportsmen from «
Regie 6» supporters of those sequestrated, and the other formed by enforcers hired by
Bucurenciu, including the Ilie brothers, known as “Geamanu Brothers.” Armed with
machine guns, hand grenades and driving expensive cars, the members of the two groups
began to hunt for each other in the capital but also in the countryside.
Cornel Dinicu of Mizil, Parliamentary advisor, and Ciprian George Stoica of Ploiesti ,
6

“Regie” is the name of a student neighborhood in Bucharest
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former vice-champion at Rowing , were accused of breaking the Arms and Ammunition
Law.
The police officers found in the Mercedes that was driven by George Ciprian Stoica a Uzilike sub-machine gun branded “Scorpion,” with 12 ammo in the round, which had the
serial number ground off.
Apparently the whole affair was masterminded by “Geamanu Brothers,” who attempted to
integrate the discotheques from “Regie” into their zone of influence, turning them into
important sources of income.
” Geamanu Brothers,” were put under many criminal charges, the investigations still
pending in different stages under the jurisdiction of either civil or military prosecutors.
One of the charges brought to Marian Ilie was illegal possession of a 9 mm “Carl Walter,”
of a magazine with six cartridges, and of an infantry petard (all of them in working
condition).

Connections in Moldova and Transdniestria
In Moldova, the existence of the shadow economy and poverty caused an increase
of criminality, generalized at the sclale of the whole society .
The weak legislation and the low salaries encouraged the development of some economic
actitivities out of the state control.
The desperate economic situation of Moldova caused a solid organization of mafiot
groups who control the entire economic and politic life. Thus, appeared a significant
number of bloody revenge actions among the leaders of the interlope world. The Minister
of Domestic Affairs makes desperate efforts to keep the situation under control, but 12,000
poorly equipped police officers cannot fight against over 6,000 well-armed criminals.
According to some Western experts, in Moldova, the mob controls 90% of the
national economy. The money of shadow economy come especially from tobacco, petrol
and alcohol smuggling and from arm and traffic with people. About 5,000 persons belong
to the criminal community and over 6,000 citizens possess arms illegally.
Although the investigators have the real names of the members of organized crime,
police prefers to disclose only the nicknames of those who control the shadow economy.
Manhaz, a Georgian citizen, came in Moldova in 1997. He organized a group which is
implicated in arms and drugs traffic. “Manhaz” was arrested in Chisinau, in 1998. He was
carrying a pistol, many cartridges, three 3 grams of opium, 7 grams of marijuana and
Moldovan, Ukrainian and Georgian identity cards .
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The anti-aircraft missiles are not only used in attacks against flying targets –planes,
helicopters – but also as explosive charges for bomb attempts. In Moldova there were 8
attempts that targeted the buildings, the corporate headquarters or the houses of some
businessmen who didn’t yield to blackmail, to enforcers or who didn’t contribute to the
“Obsceak” funds. The explosives come from Transniestria, more precisely, from the
warehouses of the Operative Troops of the Russian Army. At Colbasna, there is a huge
amount of arms that belonged to the former 14th Russian Army. These arms are now
under the control of the separatist paramilitary forces who sell them to criminal groups
around the world. There is strong evidence that some bombings in Russia used explosives
from Transdniestria.
The free circulation of persons between Romania and Moldova and the absence of
the formal borders with Transdniestria were factors that attracted the Russian mob
(Obsceak) in Moldova. All organized crime in Moldova as well as many business people are
forced to pay contributions to the "Obsceak" fund, a sort of bank of the mob that collects
dirty money. Big criminal organizations on the territory of the former Soviet Union joined
this venture.
There are free trade conventions between the CIS states which eliminate taxes on
transited goods. This facilitates the illegal transactions in the former Soviet empire. The
most active is the Chechen mob that is famous for its pragmatism. There are no means of
controlling the activity of this transnational mob. The Chechen mob infiltrated Romania
through Moldovan citizens that come to our country as students or entrepreneurs. Most of
the criminals receive help and support from Transdniestria.
In Transdniestria, there are many criminal organizations and even secret services
from different countries involved in the arm traffic with the arms and ammunition of the
Russian troops. The arm traffic from Trandsniestria to Romania consists not only of pistols
and guns but also of automatic rifles, plastic explosive and Stinger missiles. Although
traditionally these arms only transited in Romania in their way to conflict areas such as
those in Yugoslavia, lately, more and more of these arms are sold in stores over the
Romanian territory.
The Anti Organized Crime Brigade of the Romanian police knows arm traffickers
constantly assault the Romanian border with Moldova. During pursuits of smugglers,
P0lice patrols found many abandoned arms but they were seldom able to identify the
smugglers themselves.
The border police found a 7,92 mm “Steyr 95” pistol hidden under a seat in one f
the couches of the Moscow-Bucharest train. The owner abandoned the arm there and
vanished when he saw the border police was thoroughly controlling the passengers. The
owner of arm could not have been found. On CIS territory, the clandestine arm market is
very accessible: a pistol can be purchased for about 20 dollars. The cheapest arm market is
in Tiraspol, where 500 dollars can buy a tank, and a few thousand lei can buy a gun.
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The Arm and Ammunition Department of the of the Iasi County Police captured
34 arms, 846 pieces of ammunition, 108,7 kilograms of explosive material, 2373,4
kilograms of toxic substances. This information proves the street gangs in Romania
organize themselves based on the model of Western mobs. Iasi County became one of the
most active markets for arms traffic. The traffickers use this frontier county in order to
enter Romania due to its proximity to Transdniestria – the main supplier of arms on the
black market.
Besides money laundry, enforcement and “protection”, the transnational Russian
mob tries to subordinate Romanian criminal groups and to gain control over the street
crime. This is just a step away from obtaining the control over the whole economic activity
subordinating the entire politic structures of Romania.
The Agreement from Wassenaar in 1996 regarding the conventional arms and
other agreements on military exports, required Romania to cease the arm exports to illegal
markets or to traditional partners who were under ONU, EU or NATO sanctions. As a
result, armament production in Romania decreased dramatically.
The official markets lost by Romania were bluntly monopolized by the big producers of
armament.
Romania tries to keep the old customers who are not subject to international
sanctions and in the past were provided with military products by the members of the
Warsaw Treaty. These traditional customers depend on East-European exporters and
China for renewing their armament, at least until they change their military standards and
purchase policy. On this market segment, Romania is at a harsh war with the former allies,
especially with Russia. The number and size of arms orders received by the Minister of
Defense hardly cover 25-30% of the production capacity in the Arms Industry. The
situation is further worsened by the fact that the Minister of Defense turned from a
powerful arms exporter into an importer of military products for the Romanian armed
forces.
Since the export licensing procedure is so strict and thorough, no arms transaction
should have any problem. However, in the last years there were cases of exports that
seemed suspect because of the unusually high degree of confidentiality required by the
transaction. There were a few cases in which Romania tried to export arms in some
countries that were under international embargo. The reason was to preserve traditional
markets that would have been otherwise lost to competition and help the national arms
industry to survive. All these cases surfaced in the media and turned into huge scandals.
The sensibility of this subject made the Office of Controlling the Special Product
Exports 7 to avoid to publicly release the name the countries in which Romania had
interdiction to deliver armament.
7

Rom. Oficiul pentru Controlul Exporturilor de Produse Speciale (OCIEPS)
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The NATO-EU Department of the Foreign Affairs Minister is part of a joint interminister committee in charge with preventing arms deliveries in countries under
international embargo. They have been very cautious in their public statements and
avoided to talk about the circumstances of the attempts previously mentioned.
Romania cannot export arms in countries such as: Serbia, Bosnia, North Korea,
Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, Sudan, Rwanda, Somalia, Zaire etc, due to the
obligations assumed by the Romanian government in international agreements on military
exports.
Obviously, a country under international embargo will try to import armament
through the intermediation of third-party friendly countries. The Romanian responsibility
over an arms export ends when the government of the importer’s country provides an End
User Certificate, which represents a commitment that the Romanian armament will not be
re-exported. The fact that this is not always the case was proven by the controls made by
Romanian authorities in some of the beneficiary countries.

Traffic
The dismemberment of the Soviet Union and later, of Yugoslavia, the political and
military instability of the newly formed states in Europe, the recent and continuous
conflicts in Eastern Europe, are only a few of the factors that contributed to the
proliferation of the arms traffic in the Balkans. Romania has not been spared of the
presence of arm dealers on its territory or in the proximity of its borders. However, their
number is still small.
Most of the pistols smuggled in the country surface as pieces of evidence during the
investigations of murders committed or intended to be committed on the Romanian
territory. In about all paid assassinations (hits), the hit-man uses a smuggled gun because
the serial number of such a gun is not listed in the police records and therefore, even if the
gun is found after the murder is committed, it can hardly help the investigators to identify
the murderer.
The Military Unit (MU) 8 0962 is in charge with monitoring the illegal activities in
all areas of the society. MU 0962 has identified over 150 organized crime groups that
control illegal businesses. Most of these groups fight against each other in order to establish
and takeover areas of influence that sometimes extend to the highest decision levels in the
administration.
There is a incipient growing of trade with components, products and substances
used in the manufacturing of mass destruction weapons (chemical, biological and nuclear).
8
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One example is the activity of the Israeli company "Romania Emtam" that
attempted to export in Israel over 3.000 fire throwers for automated arms that had been
illegally manufactured in Romania. In order to obtain the export license, the fire throwers
had been factory-labeled as "lathe extensions".
Another example is a case in which the experts of MU 0962 arrested five persons
that tried to place a kilogram of enriched uranium 238 in exchange for 1 billion lei9.
Dason Liubov and Anatolie Cojocaru brought the uranium in Romania from Moldova.
The uranium had been stolen form Russian nuclear silos that had to be dismantled.
Toader Ciuhan of Falticeni and Nelu and Ileana Bobeica were members of the Romanian
end of this international traffic chain. At the moment they were caught in flagrant, the
uranium was packed in a metal container covered in rubber. There was information
according to which the group good perspectives to sell other 10 kilograms of uranium
coming from the same source.
A Romanian weapon shipment to Yemen reached Rwanda through intermediaries.
This country was under international embargo since February 12, 1997.
According to international evaluations Yemen is a military unstable country and a heaven
of terrorist or paramilitary groups because of the training facilities provided by the
government.
The authorities in Kigali requested the Romanian Defense Minister and
Romtehnica 10 to ship 76 tons of weapons, more precisely, 12.7 mm machine-guns, 7.62
mm AKM automated handguns, and an important quantity of magazines.
The order was split into two shipments that left Romania on April 11 and April
16, 1997 with “Acvila Air”, a Bucharest-based air cargo company.
Based on the written agreement number 70178 of April 10, 1997, “Acvila Air”
rented an AN 124 aircraft and a Ukrainian crew from the Ukrainian agent of Antonov
Company.
The aircraft received permission to land at Kigali from the director of Rwanda Air
Authority, Mr. John Ntaganda Semafara as it results from the authorization number
160601/381 from April 10, 1997 granted to the request number 100900 formulated by
“Acvila Air”.
The biggest illegal arms deal was revealed after the arrest of the Israeli citizen
Shimon Naor. Shimon Naor was arrested in Baneasa forest after a thorough operative
surveillance conducted by a joint staff from different secret services. This arrest led to a

9

Leu (pl. Lei) is the Romanian national currency.
Romtehnica is one of the few companies in Romania licensed to trade arms.
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series of other arrests of key figures in one of the most dangerous mobs, the mob of
international arms traffic.
The transnational mob networks involved in smuggling alcohol, cigarettes, drugs,
diamonds and trafficking people, arms and nuclear substances are led by KGB networks
whose foreign residents have been reactivated and recycled.
Naor’s contact man in the East is Ion Busuioc who is a head of the Russian mafia
in Moldova. Ivan Grigorevici Busuioc aka Ion Busuioc is a Moldovan citizen, born in 1953.
As a former KGB officer he was in charge with the foreign trade.
Busuioc introduced himself as an agent of “Loratel”, an oil trading company,
registered in Cyprus. He contacted many Romanian companies in his quality of agent of
the Moscow company “Kanaker Inestment and Commerce Corp” led by Valeriy Shevelev,
trying to sell military products. At the end of 1998, Busuioc contacted Stanojevic
Milutinovic Dragan, the Bucharest agent of the Cypriote companies “Hastock Ltd” and
“Loratel Trading Ltd.” Soon afterwards he started to use the Bucharest office of these
companies. Along with Dragan, Busuioc intermediated deals with arms from the
Commonwealth of the Independent States (CIS). Busuioc is a shareholder in the Cyprus
branch of “Armitech Company Inc” from Panama. He also represents “Armimpex
Hightech Ltd.” and “Saltech Ltd.” from Cyprus.
Busuioc contacted Shimon Naor and offer the later a number of military products
from CIS. In 1999, the transactions between the two extended. Thus, they collaborated in
contracting and completing arms transactions with countries under international embargo.
In some cases they tried to persuade Romanian companies to act as intermediaries, by
using false end-user certificates provided by Shimon Naor.
The potential involvement of Romanian companies in such transactions could have
affected the international image of Romania.
The last business initiated by the two targeted a temporary import in Romania of
20,000 122 mm projectiles from the Czech Republic. This import was to be done by
“Deliza Ltd.” from Cyprus, a company of the Ukrainian citizen Vladimir Mihailovici Mazin
whose Bucharest representative was Ivan Grigorevici Busuioc. Busuioc intended to export
the projectiles from Romania to Ethiopia through the Israeli company “LR Avionics,”
represented by Shimon Naor. The whole deal was based on a false End User Certificate for
Nigeria. Romanian authorities blocked the whole deal.

The Transnational Organized Crime Network of Former KGB Agents
Ivan Grigorevici Busuioc is known as an important member of a transnational
organized crime network, specializing in arms traffic. This network is coordinated by
Russian citizens who have contacts in many European and African states. The majority of
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network’s Russian members are former KGB officers. The purpose of this network is to
obtain high level of profits from trading CIS and East European arms in international
areas of conflict. In order to attain their goal, the members of the network need economic
and military intelligence information from the countries they operate within. This
information is usually obtained by corrupting and blackmailing the dignitaries of these
countries.
The following list presents the most important members of the network and their contacts
in Romania.
Ivan Turcanu is a Russian citizen and president of "Armitech Company Inc" registered in
Panama. This company has a branch in Cyprus, which is run by Ivan Grigorevici Busuioc,
Vladimir Siminiuc, Costica Laptes and Dragos Fodor. Apparently, Turcanu is the
coordinator of the network. He is a lawyer and he operates mainly from Moscow. Turcanu
is also an agent of "Armimpex Hightech Ltd" and "Saltech Ltd" of Cyprus.
Vladimir Mihailovici Mazin is a Ukrainian citizen and manager of “Ukrspetsexport”
company from Kiev and of "Kolnet Ltd" and "Deliza" companies in Cyprus.
Vladimir Siminiuc is a citizen of Moldova and, from 1998, a Romanian citizen as well.
Former officer in the Moldovan army, Siminiuc is currently a businessman and the main
shareholder of “Willing” – company in the Russian Federation. He is very close to General
Alexandr Lebed, the former commander of the 14th Army based in Transdniestria.
Siminiuc is also a representative of "Armimpex Hightech Ltd." and "Saltech Ltd."
Stanojevic Milutinovic Dragan is the Bucharest representative of the Cypriote companies
"Hastock Ltd." and "Loratel Trading Ltd." He works in Bucharest along with his son–
Stanojevic Alecsandar aka Sasha. "Loratel" company is used as a cover by the network for
the bank transfers involved by the businesses they conduct.
Costica Laptes is a shareholder of "Armitech Company Inc", and a representative of
"Armimpex Hightech Ltd" and "Saltech Ltd". Laptes connected Busuioc and Siminiuc with
Shimon Naor.
The cigarette smuggling business is directly connected the illegal arm traffic. It is well
know that “Air Sofia” - a company involved in the Naor case – has been involved in such
illegal activities for a long time. US State Department officially condemned this company
for it’s involvement in transporting missiles to North Korea and Iran.
Romanian military products were sold at lower prices than those of similar products sold
on the world arms market. Naor’s commission was 50 times greater than the amount
cashed by the Romanian manufacturers.
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Brothers Mike and Ellie Nassar arrived in Romania following the requests made at
the Romanian Embassy in Beirut by a well known arms dealer. The dealer asked the
Romanian embassy to put him in touch with a Romanian arms provider. He had a list of
infantry and artillery arms and ammunition specific to they armies of the Warsaw Treaty
that he wanted to acquire. The Romanian military attaché informed the Military
Intelligence Department 11 and the later further submitted the request to Romtehnica. The
Nassar brother began the export of arms, acting as agents for the Lebanese dealer. They
operations were monitored by a number of foreign intelligence agencies, including Mossad.
During a big operation of disarming the rebels, the peace-keeping troops in Kosovo
(KFOR) discovered a military arsenal in Drenita area. The arsenal belonged to the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). The arsenal consisted of Romanian, Russian, Chinese and
American arms, including 500,000 cartridges, 20.000 grenades, 150 anti-tank rockets, 15
mortars, bomb-shells and automatic weapons. There is no evidence that Romania
delivered the arms directly to the rebels, and in fact, this probably didn’t happen.
Until 1996, the Romanian government had a pro-Serbian attitude and had not
allowed any arms exports intended for the enemies of the Serbs. After 1996 when conflict
in Kosovo started, the Romanian Government aligned to the Western policy of
condemning Milosevici’s intervention in Kosovo. Some of the Western powers supplied
the Albanian rebels with arms saying that they have help the Albanians to defend
themselves against the Serb aggression.
Most of the support came in from Albania who has never been under international
military embargo. Therefore, all of the arms shipments coming from Tirana were perfectly
legal.
Since the Romanian arms trade was in decline, potential shipments to Albania
represented an opportunity and the Romanian arms trading companies were able to legally
export arms to Tirana.
It is well known that the Albanian government supported the Albanians in Kosovo
by sending them arms and that the Western powers closed their eyes to this break of
international law on the grounds that the Albanian rebels were aggressed by Milosevici.
Therefore, there is a possibility that the Romanian arms exported in Albania got in the
hands of KLA. In this case, Albania, as the official importer, bears the full responsibility.
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Appendix: Police Records
Frontier Traffic. At the Romanian-Moldovian frontier at Sculeni- Prut, the police stopped two
heavy trucks belonging to a Slovakian transport company. The trucks had the registration plates GAA - 0389
and KN – 7972 and were driven by the Slovakian citizens Radvansky Gabriel and Horvath Roman.
The goods they were transporting were accompanied by an invoice issued by SC Rãut SRL, a company from
Bãlti, Moldova. The goods were sent to Marilyn Sales Corporation, New York, USA. The police found that
the goods listed on the invoice were, in fact, hydro-acoustic buoys, devices used for aerial and under water
detection.
The contract between Rãut SRL, from Bãlti, and Marilyn Sales Company, New York, stipulated the
transport should have arrived in France, and then in India as final destination. There were evidences that
four similar transports of this kind had already been sent.
The contract mentions that the exporter was also the manufacturer of the products, which is
impossible because Moldova does not have such technology. The most likely producer is Russia and probably
the buyer is one of the countries under embargo, such as Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Sudan or even India.
Transdniestria is a huge armament market and many secret services take advantage of that. The
Romanian criminal organizations are present on that market too, trying to arm themselves with pistols, rifles,
machine guns and even rocket launchers.
On 15th of May 1998 the truck driven by Robert Buzasi, a Slovakian citizen, was stopped for a
frontier control. When the container compartment was unsealed, the Romanian frontier guards found
eighteen 7.62 machine-guns used on armored amphibian transporters. In the truck, aside from the 18
machine-guns, the police found spare parts and accessories.
This year, Romanian customs officers found two military pistols, ten air guns, three hunting
shotguns, a machine gun, 99 war cartridges, 96 hunting cartridges and 83 gas cartridges. Last year, the
customs officers confiscated 9 pistols, 10 hunting shotguns of various calibers and several thousands of
cartridges with bullets or pellets.
In Arad County, at Turnu check-point, the guards found a 1974 Carpati pistol, and twenty-two 7.65
mm bullets in an Alfa-Romeo driven by the Turkish citizen Tanriverdi Omer. The gun and the ammunitio n
were packed in a plastic bag and hidden behind the car battery.
The Turkish man presented a Belgian passport which had previously been reported stolen by Belgium
Embassy. The Turk declared that he used the Belgian passport in order to avoid visa problems in the
Schengen area.
He said that he had bought the gun and the passport from a stranger in a gas station, some 50 km
away from Zagreb. He had purchased them for DM 100.
Petricã Rusu, age 28, of Dorobantu village, Constanta County and Gheorge Cristache age 50, of
Valea Rîmnicului, Buzãu County, tried to sell am atomic pile in exchage for $10,000. The pile was probably
made in the former USSR and contained 189 grams of enriched uranium and with a radioactivity 70 times
bigger than in natural radioactivity.
The atomic pile could have been used in the manufacturing of a home-made explosive device. The
two people were irradiated because the container in which they kept pile had no protection against
radioactivity.
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arrested in Bucharest, on the Ferdinad Boulevard, at the

Sergii Badea, age 25, confessed he had been involved in arms traffic. He had a semi-automatic 9 mm Makarov
pistol. The gun was equipped with a silencer and stored 9 bullets.
Valeriu Gonta, age 26 is also a Moldavan citizen. He was to sell his gun to a Chinese citizen for
1,500 dollars.
The last murders or attempts of murder in Bucharest made use of9 mm pistols. In almost all cases
police had information that the criminals were paid hit-men from Moldova and Ukrain.
An employee at "Dezrobirea - Romned" SA company, in Constantza informed the Police that he
found two rockets, one of 20 mm caliber and one of 55mm, 16 hand grenades in a car shipment of scrap
iron which came from “Marosca” company in Slatina. The scrap iron was to be taken over and recycled by
“Eurofer” company in Constantza.
Thefts of Ammunition and Arms. Ten defensive grenades and seven hundred 7.62 mm war
cartridges were stolen from an ammunition warehouse of the Military Unit 01404 in Timisoara. The thieves
remained unidentified.
A soldier of MU 01545 of Apata, Brasov County stole 15 pistols, 1000 cartridges, 3 military
binoculars and 3 offensive grenades. He sold them in the Brasov Rail Station area at various prices, up to DM
1,000.
The buyers were Dan Feldioreanu, Marius Dinicã, Mihai Mesu, Mocsel Geza, Ghitã Iacob, Neculai
Bors, Valentin Teslaru, Cãtãlin Horhocia. All these were part of the underworld and had criminal records.
Soldier Gerd Wibiral, age 26, of MU 01109 in Timisoara, was the guard on duty when he was
attacked by unidentified persons who beat him up and stole his gun and ammo. He was brought to the
County Hospital in Timisoara in a severe condition. This happened three months after the attack at Military
Unit 014004 despite following that event, 3 soldiers were arrested for unfulfilling their duties.
In a trashcan on the platform of Slatina Rail Station a janitor found 2 grenades. The Officer Simion
Dumitru in charge with Unit’s Public Relations ruled out the possibility that these grenades had been stolen
from MU 01517.
Bacau Criminal Police confiscated 82 cartridges and a military parachute from Marius Curucli, age
28, former worker for the army. He stole a part of the ammunition from the very military unit in Timisoara
in which he had accomplished his military service, 9 years before.
An ammunition and explosive warehouse of MU 01172 Caransebes was broken in. The thieves
took a box with 20 offensive grenades and a box with 800 7.62 mm cartridges. The lock of the warehouse was
cut and the seal broken.
A special case of arms theft is that of Sgt. Viorel Albu in the SRI Anti-Terrorist Brigade in Bucharest. Later in
his career, Albu was transferred to SRI Rîmnicu Vîlcea.
He developed some depressive and paranoid-obsessive symptoms that led him to decide to kill his
wife. He broke in the ammunition warehouse and stole 2 defensive grenades type F-1 and 10 heads type
UZRGM then, carrying the grenades in his pockets, he left the base to meet his wife.
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During that meeting he detonated the grenades. Unfortunately, the explosion wounded two other
people: Adrian and Vasile Militaru – father and son, both policemen. The intended suicide turned into
bloodshed but luckily, nobody lost his life.
Illegal Possession of Arms and Ammunition . The police officers of the Arms, Explosives and Toxic
Substances Division of the Bihor County Police searched two of the residences of Attila Baroczi, one in
Marghita and one in Oradea. Baroczi, age 20 was charged with illegal possession of fourty-seven 5.6 mm
cartridges and a gun with the serial number 0991 along with 6 cartridges with pellets for hunting.
The Bihor County Police discovered some arms and ammunition in the house of a senior citizen who had
bought them two weeks before from an unidentified person. Among the arms found there, there was a pistol
model NIE -38 Pochet, made in Germany with a signal-rocket launcher device, fifty-four 9 mm cartridges,
some loaded with tear-gas and some for acustic signaling, 8 signal-rockets, ten 16 mm hunting cartridges and
250 grams of smokeless gun powder.
Hunedoara County Police found two persons who had home-made hunting guns. Mise Balint, age 67, farmer
in Batrina village owned illegally a home-made gun, caliber 12 and 2 cartridges, with a linear meter fuse
Bickford. Viorel Bistrian of the same village, age 51, illegally possessed two home-made hunting guns, caliber
12, four hunting cartridges and 100 grams of gun powder.
In Bosorod Village, the police found at a farmer’s house an Austrian hunting gun. Octavian Cugerean, age
36, possessed 19 hunting cartridges and parts used in the manufacturing of ammunition.
Toplita City Police arrested Manole Urzica, age 24, of Galautas Village, Harghita County for illegal
possession of a military gun, caliber 7.92 mm.
Petru Ujica, age 27, of Stinceni Village was arrested for illegal possession of 2 military gun pipes, a gun-pipe
for a hunting gun, five 16 mm hunting cartridges, three 9 mm military cartridges, 6 fuses for hunting
cartridges, a delay fuse for initialization, 70 grams of TNT and 200 grams of gun powder for cartridges.
Police arrested one of the most dangerous gangs of thieves operating in Bucharest and Dimbovita County.
The head of the gang was Tudor Nicolae of Ploiesti, age 30, with a rich criminal record.
The other two members were Catoiu Iulian Aurel, age 23 and Pirvu Alin, age 22, both of them from Ploiesti.
Police found them in possession of a 9 mm Browning pistol with 4 cartridges, aa Walther pistol with 46
cartridges, and another fire arm with 89 cartridges. Police investigations revealed that the guns were stolen
and had been used.
Francisc Bancsa of Oradea was born in 1956. In 1977 he left Romania for France where he joined the
Foreign Legion. In 1983 he left the Legion and established in Belgium, in Jemeppe -Sur-Sambre city. There
he formed a gang whose members were Marc Goffart, Awoust Dimitri and Jean (nephew and uncle),
Giovanni Ruzzu, Bernard Prignot, Pascal Terwagne and the Romanian Ion Incze.
Bancsa’s gang was specializing in armed robbery of big stores, banks and post offices and in attacking the
armored money transports.
In 1997 Bancsa was hiding in Romania when the Bruxelles branch of Interpol asked for his extradition and
indicated the places in which he might hide.
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The Romanian police found in his apartment 3 Kalasnikov – AK47 machine handguns, 270 war cartridges, 9
machine handgun magazines.
A taxi driver was threatened with a pistol in front of the "Top Netty" bar in Timisoara. He requested the
assistance of his work colleagues from the “Bimbo” taxi company. The aggressor was caught and handover to
the police. His name is Stelian Macesanu aka “The Butcher”, age 29 who had a criminal record. He illegally
possessed an 8 mm HS pistol loaded with 3 tear-gas cartridges.
Costel Constantin, the former owner of the "Sexy Club" bar in Bucharest and a protégée of the Democrat
Party was charged with breaking the Arms and Ammunition Law by illegally possessing a Bertta pistol and
100 cartridges.
The police arrested two students in the Timisoara University campus. They were found carrying four homemade guns, of which, one had a silencer, six 12 mm cartridges and four 6 mm cartridges. The police found in
their dorms 4 pipes that were to be used in the manufacturing of other guns, 2 black masks and a pair of
black gloves.
Marius Lazar, age 22 and Cristian Preda, age 22, both from Iasi, robbed the house of a US Embassy employee
in Bucharest. The police found them hiding in Iasi after they stole a pistol, ten cartridges, jewels and other
goods from the house of a dignitary.

Air Guns. The Need for a New Law
In Romania, the air guns can be bought at any gun-store. They are inexpensive, and the buyers do not have to
present any license or permit in order to acquire them because the Law number 11/1996 excludes the air
guns and pistols from the list of guns whose possession require a permit.
A 4.5 mm air pistol Slavia, Saisy or Walther can be purchased for 1-2.5 million lei. A 4.5 mm air gun is less
than 15 million lei. The difference between pistols and guns is given by the speed of the projectile when it
leaves the arm (110 m/s for pistols and 185 m/s for guns).
Due to their free sale, there were cases in which the air guns got on the hands of evildoers or kids who caused
real tragedies by playing with them.
Stefan Lupsor, an ambulance driver for Bistrita City Hospital, was cleaning his air gun when he accidentally
shot in the head Katalin Buther Kresz, age 10.
In the Eremitu village (Mures County), a five year old boy shot his two year old sister with a 4.5 mm Salvia
gun which he took it as a broom. The air gun was left unlocked by their grandfather, Kibedy Iosif, age 75.
The girl lost an eye.
On the 6th of May, 1998, Laurentiu Draghici of Barlad, age 25, was shoot in the head three times.
Corin Panc Sechelaride, an entrepreneur from Bucharest shot at a waste management driver because he
didn’t like the way the later drove past his car.
Simona Simu, a nine-year-old girl from Blaj was accidentally shot in the face from a small distance by Petro
Iacob, age 17. The teenager who leaved in the neighborhood, , wanting to impress his friends, got out from
house with the gun on his shoulder. Reaching the playground, Petru Iacob negligent ly handled the arm and
shot Simona Simu right in the face with a lead pellet.
Maria Ghinga from Iasi found in her parents’ garden a 7.65 mm SACM gun, in good condition. The woman
did not turn the arm to the Police. Instead she took it home and hid it in the wardrobe. Maria Ghinga’s
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daughter found the gun, took it and went in front of their block to play with it. The little girl was seen by a
police officer who confiscated the arm before her play turned into a tragedy.
A construction engineer, Vasile Daniel Pitfor, age 40, shot a six year old boy with 4.5 mm pistol because he
was noisy in Giulesti, Bucharest. The victim’s name is Catalin George Mohanu .
Ionel Mihai, age 11, of Sintesti village, Ilfov County, shot his sister, Simona Mihai, age 3, while he was
playing with his father’s air gun. The girl was wounded in the right leg haunch. He had taken the 4.5 mm
gun from his father’s car .
Two brothers , Nelu-Aurelian and Cosmin-Valentin Rus (ages 17 and 15) were in their grandmother’s
custody, in Seulia village, Mures County. One day they took the train to Taut Village, Metes County. There
they tried to find jobs.
The forester, Ile Bacila, age 46 hired the brothers as part-time workers. One day time he noticed that his
shotgun had disappeared. The two teenagers forced the padlock of the metal box in which the forester legally
kept his 7.62 mm “TT” gun, serial number AX-91, 6 bullets, a 12 mm “JJ” shotgun, and a sports gun with
ammunition. The two boys took the guns and ammunition. Initially, they intended to stop a car and force
the driver to take them home, in Seulia. However, being pursued by the police, they walked about 100 km,
hiding in different places until the police found them in Girbova de Jos village, an isolated and afforested
place .
Nelu Aurelian shot twice against the police officers. Fortunately, one bullet missed and the other only
wounded the first sergeant Moldovan in the shoulder. Since the boys were minors, the police could not fire
back.
The two brothers ran away in the forest and lost their shoes. From that moment they walked ten kilometers,
bare-foot through snow and water
In Radesti village, between Aiud and Ocna Mures, Nelu forced a boatman to take them across the Mures
river.
Afterwards, the two brothers broke into a doctor’s country house and stole a 4.5 mm “Pioner” air gun.
The fugitives arrived in Livezile village, close to Aiud–Buru highway. They entered the house of Damaschin
Popa, age 67, and demanded food. Although scared by the gun the younger brother held in his hand, Popa
managed to send his son to call the police.
The youngsters were arrested and their guns confiscated.
Nelu-Aurelian Rusu was charged with attempt to murder, stealing private property, and breaking the Arms
and Ammunition Law. His brother, Cosmin-Valentin was sent to a detention institution for minors where he
is to be examined by a psychiatrist.
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